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 While the public debate over reforms to Employment Insurance centres on
regional fairness in eligibility requirements, it is critical that the EI program
remain affordable in good times and bad. 
 To avoid pro-cyclical EI premium decreases during booms and harmful
premium increases during downturns, the challenge is to create a rate-setting
mechanism that would balance the books over the ebbs and flows of
economic cycles, and permit yearly EI account balances to vary. 
 Ottawa also needs to introduce reforms that insulate the EI fund’s management
from political interference – and protect that fund from governments that would
dip into EI surpluses for general spending. One model is the Canada Pension
Plan Investment Board.
The authors would like to thank Finn Poschmann, Bill Robson, Michael Bédard, and David Gray for their comments.
1 The employee premium rate is the policy rate chosen each year. Employers pay 1.4 times the chosen employee amount. The
employee rate for 2009 and 2010 is 1.73 percent of insurable earnings. Including employer contributions, the total premium
rate is 4.15 percent, much higher than the employee rate alone. 
Under the current Employment Insurance (EI) premium rate-setting mechanism, Canada’s recently poor
economic performance would have, without federal intervention, forced premiums to increase in 2010. That
would have placed a fresh tax burden on employees and employers just as recovery was likely to take hold.
The February 2009 federal budget postponed the inevitable rate increases, but looking to 2011 and beyond,
the mechanism clearly needs repair. 
Over the last two decades, EI premium rates were generally set higher than break-even levels (Figure 1).
1
The resulting surpluses went to the federal budget’s bottom line, meaning the program labelled EI was
funding general government expenditures, and that the federal fiscal balance, then looking strong, was not
quite what it seemed. The result was blurred accountability in EI program funding and management,
accompanied by the growing of non-insurance benefits within EI, such as fishing and parental benefits, far
removed from EI’s original income insurance rationale (Poschmann and Robson 2001).
History is set to repeat itself. The 2009 federal budget foresees sharply rising EI premiums beginning in
2011, resulting in EI contributions that exceed benefits by about $3.4 billion in 2013/14. With a slim
budgetary surplus of $700 million projected for the same year, the federal government risks again becoming
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Today’s policy challenge is to create a rate-setting mechanism that would achieve a relatively stable premium rate 
that would balance the books over the ebbs and flows of economic cycles, by allowing yearly EI account balances to vary. 
This would avoid pro-cyclical rate decreases during booms and harmful premium increases during downturns (see 
Appendix Box A1 for a short history of EI financing).
To avoid the likelihood of political pressure again overwhelming the rate-setting mechanism, Ottawa needs also to
introduce EI Account Management reforms that fully insulate the EI fund’s management from political oversight. One
model is the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and the CPP Investment Board, which invests the CPP Fund independently from
political influence. If such governance reforms were undertaken, EI finances could be separated from the annual
budgetary bottom line, and EI’s net revenue would not affect the budget balance. Together, these reforms should establish
fiscal integrity in a program whose accountability and purpose have become murky over time.
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Figure 1: Total Premium Rates, Break-even Rates, Annual Balance and Cumulative Balance, 1990 to 2008
Sources: CIA (2007); Public Accounts; HRSDC, Outlook for the EI account in 2004; Various Chief Actuary Reports on EI Premium Rate; and authors’
calculations.
Notes: 1) In June 1991, the total premium rate changed from 5.40 percent to 6.72 percent due to the intervention of the Minister of Human Resources.
2) Annual surplus results from this date forward are authors’ calculations based on public accounts figures and the Fiscal Monitor.INDEPENDENT REASONED RELEVANT
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2 For complete details on revenue sensitivities, see Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, Report of the Chief Actuary to the
Employment Insurance Commission on the Employment Insurance Premium Rate and Maximum Insurable Earnings for 2009, pp. 9 and 10.
3 The term business cycle, although lacking a generally accepted definition, was undefined in the 1996 EI Act. For the purpose of this
paper, we simply define a business cycle as the annual up and down movements – the expansions and contractions – of the Canadian
economy around its long term trend. See Cross (1996) for a complete discussion of this term. Business cycles are undefined in duration,
because no cycle perfectly matches a previous one. For our purposes, we take into account the most recent experience of business cycles.
Cross (1996) found the cycle duration, peak to peak, was roughly 8.75 years from 1982 to 1990. The subsequent contraction and
expansion in the 1990s was related in severity and duration. We focus on the manifestation of business cycles in unemployment rates.
More use of stochastic projections would yield a more robust forecast of EI account balances.
4 The beneficiaries-to-unemployed (b/u) ratio’s recent history is one of significant structural change (HRSDC 1998, Kerr 1999). Program
reforms and a significant expansion of self-employed workers have brought the ratio down from around 80 percent in the 1980s to fewer than
50 percent in current periods and have brought into question the ratio’s significance as an indicator of EI coverage. Despite numerous
unsuccessful attempts to predict the ratio’s future path, we do agree with previous projections that overall pressures should push the ratio
upwards (Sargent 1998) and we therefore assume for each scenario that the b/u ratio will move upwards much like it did in the 1980s
recession, fall somewhat, and then flatten out. 
5 Our projections use a real interest rate of 1.61 percent, based on the annual long-term government bond yield on January 5, 2009, and 2
percent annual inflation, the central point in the Bank of Canada’s inflation targeting band. The notional interest rates that currently
apply to the EI account’s cumulative surplus – 90 percent of the monthly average of the three-month T-bill rate –  is chosen by the
Minister of Finance, and we feel that this rate is unfairly low, thereby underestimating the reasonably attainable levels of interest income. 
6 The Financing Board manages a separate bank account in which a $2 billion cash reserve must be maintained.
7 It is important to remember that the numerical examples demonstrate only an approximate application of the formulas and principles
embodied within the rules for each approach. The actual course of action under each scenario could change depending on outside influences. 
The Current Rate-Setting Method Inadequately Copes with Business Cycles 
During the recessionary phase of the business cycle, premiums are sure to rise (Table 1). Under existing rules the Canadian
Employment Insurance Financing Board is required to increase EI premiums to a level that not only ensures the program
breaks even on a yearly basis, but also replenishes any potential amounts drawn down from the reserve.
6
For the most severe scenario, the 1980s downturn, a strict application of this mechanism would require the premium
rate to increase by about 1.95 percentage points in 2011 – more than 13 times the annual legislated premium change
limit of 0.15 percentage points. Should rate hikes be held to the 0.15 percentage points limit, deficits will emerge and a
pattern of rate increases and decreases occur over the projection period.
7 This process’s obvious drawback is that it
excessively focuses on a specific goal – the annual balancing of the books – instead of concentrating on the real objective
– that is, the cumulative account balance over the business cycle. 
Empirical investigation of alternative economic scenarios helps understand the likely evolution of the EI Account’s annual
balance, cumulative balance and premium rates under existing rules and an alternative rate-setting mechanism.
Using the sensitivity analysis from the Chief Actuary’s 2009 Report to the EI Commission, our future projections
simulate the results on the EI Account – net of administrative costs – should the changes to unemployment rates in
the two most recent recessions manifest themselves in upcoming years.
2 A third scenario projects the outcomes in a
milder downturn. 
The unemployment results for 2009 and beyond use the year-over-year changes to unemployment beginning with
the first year of previous downturns. Subsequent year-over-year changes then follow. Note that the length of the
projection period, or the duration of the business cycle, is nine years for each scenario.
3
The Chief Actuary’s sensitivity projections also take into account, albeit with less emphasis, changes in the ratio of
EI beneficiaries to unemployed workers. Our simulations examine possible future variations, for each scenario, given
the history of the early 1980s recession.
4
Further, though interest income is not currently used to determine future premium rates, we include interest
income in each of our account balance scenarios to reflect the operation of an independent account.
5 We also
assume an initial balance of $2 billion, the level prescribed in the 2008 Budget.
Box A: Methodology: Future Unemployment Rates and EI Finances| 4 e-brief
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Table 1: Downturns Place Upward Pressure on Premiums: End-of-Year Employment Insurance Account
Balance Projections, 2009 to 2017
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on 2009 Report of the Chief Actuary to the Employment Insurance Commission. 
Projections Using Current Rate-Setting Mechanism
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1980s  Balance Annual -7.7 -9.2 -5.4 -2.2 1.3 4.3 7.6 8.2 6.6
Downturn (2009 $billion) Cumulative -5.7 -15.0 -20.6 -23.2 -22.3 -18.3 -11.0 -3.0 3.5
Premium Rate (%) 4.15 4.15 4.51 4.87 5.23 5.59 5.95 5.95 5.59
1990s  Balance Annual -5.8 -7.4 -4.8 -1.0 2.4 3.8 6.4 6.0 5.5
Downturn (2009 $billion) Cumulative -3.8 -11.3 -16.2 -17.5 -15.4 -11.8 -5.6 0.4 5.9
Premium Rate (%) 4.15 4.15 4.51 4.87 5.23 5.59 5.95 5.59 5.23
Mild Balance Annual -4.4 -5.3 -2.5 0.5 3.1 4.7 3.5 2.6 1.5
Downturn (2009 $billion) Cumulative -2.4 -7.7 -10.4 -10.1 -7.1 -2.6 0.9 3.5 5.0
Premium Rate (%) 4.15 4.15 4.51 4.87 5.23 5.59 5.23 4.87 4.51
Projections Using Proposed Mechanism
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1980s  Balance Annual -7.7 -9.2 -4.6 -1.5 1.5 2.9 4.5 5.1 5.1
Downturn (2009 $billion) Cumulative -5.7 -15.0 -19.9 -21.6 -20.5 -17.9 -13.7 -8.9 -3.9
Premium Rate (%) 4.15 4.15 4.68 5.04 5.28 5.28 5.28 5.28 5.28
1990s  Balance Annual -5.8 -7.4 -4.0 -0.2 1.5 1.3 2.2 3.5 4.6
Downturn (2009 $billion) Cumulative -3.8 -11.3 -15.4 -15.9 -14.7 -13.6 -11.6 -8.3 -3.8
Premium Rate (%) 4.15 4.15 4.68 5.04 5.04 5.04 5.04 5.04 5.04
Mild Balance Annual -4.4 -5.3 -1.7 0.1 1.1 1.0 1.5 2.2 2.8
Downturn (2009 $billion) Cumulative -2.4 -7.7 -9.6 -9.6 -8.7 -7.8 -6.4 -4.3 -1.5
Premium Rate (%) 4.15 4.15 4.68 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80INDEPENDENT REASONED RELEVANT
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8 In 1998, the Chief Actuary of the EI program recommended that the rate be set at approximately 1.90 to 2.10 percent over the upcoming
business cycle. The actuary also recommended a reserve fund of between $10 and $15 billion to support revenue shortfalls in a recession. In
2000, the recommended stable premiums were between 1.70 and 2.20 percent with a reserve of $15 to $20 billion. However, rates were set at
levels much higher than those proposed by the Chief Actuary (CIA 2007). 
9 Section 66.2 of the EI Act requires EI’s Chief Actuary to use the Ministry of Finance’s economic projections in his or her forecast of the break-
even premium rate. Because downturns can be abrupt, further reforms should allow the Chief Actuary more independence to gauge the up- and
down-side risks. 
10 The desire for an off-budget account was expressed by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA 2007), the International Labour Office
(Plamondon et al. 2002), and during recent public consultations with business and labour groups (Canada 2003).
11 Public Sector Accounting Handbook, Section PS 1300.07.
Reforming EI Financing 
We propose to reform the financing of the EI program by adopting a new rate-setting mechanism. To be sustainable, this
mechanism must be robust to the policy pressures that undermined the 1996 mechanism, and this requires reforming the EI
Account’s management framework.
A New Rate-Setting Mechanism
We propose that a relatively constant premium rate be determined on an actuarial basis to ensure the EI account’s
cumulative balance, over the medium term, remains within reasonable boundaries – say within plus or minus $15 billion.
The Chief Actuary would be tasked with finding the rate that would balance the account.
8
If the EI account’s cumulative balance moved out of the boundaries – reflecting a structural change in unemployment or
benefit levels – an automatic process would increase or lower the premium rate for the long term. This way, as the economy
headed into a downturn, the premium rate could be kept constant as deficits were incurred. Then, as the economy
recovered, revenues would rise, deficits could be repaid, and surpluses would accumulate, all the while holding premium
rates steady.
EI Account Management Needs Reform
Reasonably stable EI premiums are not a guaranteed result of an appropriate rate-setting formula: forecasts are imperfect,
changes to program benefits can occur with little warning
9 and, as recent failures suggest, the system of governance can
exert significant influence on the choice of rates when EI contributions become central to the overall budgetary policy of the
government. 
Triggered by 1996 reforms, a massive EI Account surplus accumulated because rates were chosen not only to serve the
interests of program contributors but to achieve fiscal goals as well (Poschmann and Robson 2001). In other words, the
federal commitment to yearly balanced budgets conflicted with the objectives of the EI Account rate-setting mechanism. Even
though enough reserves were accumulated in the EI account to ensure rate stability over the business cycle, drawdowns on
those reserves in any given year would have had a direct negative impact on the federal overall budgetary balance in that year. 
One way to completely isolate EI program finances from federal budgetary policies would be to separate the EI account
from the Public Accounts of Canada, and to manage the separate Account transparently at arm’s length from the federal
government.
10 In its current form, however, segregating the EI account may violate the broad public accounting principle
that a government’s financial statements should comprise all activities and organizations controlled by that government.
11
To comply with public accounting standards, a number of changes would be needed to lessen the federal government’s
influence over the EI program’s operation. For example, the federal government should not have the power to, or be involved
in, appointing or removing a majority of the members of the board, which would set contribution rates and manage the
finances of the program. Nor should government be involved in budget approval for program administration. In addition, the
design of benefits and contributions should be enshrined in legislation – not in regulation – ensuring that the federal| 6 e-brief
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government could not unilaterally change the design of the program without the consent of Parliament. 
If the government is unwilling to adopt the proposed governance reforms, and balancing accounting principles
with macroeconomic stability objectives proves cumbersome, Ottawa should take other steps to distance EI accounting
from the federal bottom line. For example, the EI account’s annual balance could be removed from consideration in
budget planning – the government policy would target a bottom line that excluded EI. The EI account would then still
be part of federal financial statements. 
Conclusion
Raising taxes in bad times and lowering taxes in good times deepens economic cycles and reduces any program’s
ability to act as an automatic economic stabilizer. We see our proposed reform – allowing for relative rate stability
through a renewed formula and reformed management of program finances – as crucial to the long-term legitimacy
and credibility of EI program financing.
Appendix
12 The Supreme Court of Canada ruled on December 11, 2008, that the federal government transformed EI premiums (collected for specific
purposes) into payroll taxes (collected for general purposes) in 2002, 2003, and 2005, and declared this practice illegal unless it can be clearly
demonstrated that Parliament intended to delegate its taxing power authority to the governor-in-council. 
Since the Second World War, the EI account has seen numerous reforms to its governance structure and its premium
rate-setting rules (Table A1). For most of its history, the federal government was a major contributor to EI revenues.
In 1986, on the recommendation of the Auditor General, the Unemployment Insurance (UI) Account, as it was then
named, was consolidated with the government’s public accounts to present a comprehensive view of government
activities, because to do otherwise would obscure a contingent liability to which federal taxpayers are ultimately
exposed. 
The government halted transfers in 1990, making the financing of the program entirely dependent on employer
and employee contributions. Since then, uninsured individuals – mostly the self-employed who represent more than
15 percent of Canada’s labour force – do not contribute to the program through transfers from general government
revenues.
The Unemployment Insurance (UI) Act of 1971 created a rate-setting mechanism based on three-year historical
break-even rates, giving rise to a problem of pro-cyclicality – rising premium rates in bad economic times (Kerr
2005). This contributed to the need for 1996 reforms to the Employment Insurance Act, which set in place the
requirement for a relatively stable premium rate over the business cycle.   
Annual surpluses grew, however, and from 2001 to 2005 the rate-setting process was suspended and rate-setting
powers handed over to the governor-in-council (Cabinet).
12 In 2005, the federal government introduced a new rate-
setting mechanism, which stipulated that the next year’s projected revenues must equal projected expenses; however,
the premium rate could not change by more than 0.15 percentage points from the previous year’s rate. Finally, in
2008, the government created an independent body, the Canada Employment Insurance Financing Board, to ensure
that future EI premiums be dedicated exclusively to benefits. The current rate-setting mechanism will not be fully
implemented until 2011, since the rate for 2010 was fixed by the February 2009 federal budget.
Box A1: A Brief History of EI Governance and Rate-Setting RulesINDEPENDENT REASONED RELEVANT
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Table A1: Rate-Setting Regimes and Governance of the Employment Insurance Account, 
1941 to present
Period Rate-Setting Rules, Governance Structure, and Role of Actuary Government Funding Ministerial 
Override Powers
1941 - 1971 No specific rules. Goal was to keep system in financial equilibrium.
The Unemployment Insurance Commission, a tripartite body with
labour, business, and government representation, determined rates.
UI Account off-budget, and actuary provided advice on rate levels.
20 percent of employer-employee
contributions and administrative fees.
No
1972 - 1996 Rates set annually by UI Commission, subject to government
approval. Rates were chosen according the last three-year average of
benefits plus (minus) any amount required to remove or reduce a
deficit (surplus) in the UI Account. Actuarial advice given in-house.
Government would support costs
when unemployment rate
increased.(1) No longer paid for
administration fees.
No
1976  Same as above The Commission raised rates to cover
the transfer of $500 million in costs
from government to private firms.
No
1978  Commission brought under department of Manpower and Immi-
gration. Deputy Minister becomes automatic chair of commission.
Same as above Yes
1986  Account is made part of federal budget and consolidated with Public
Accounts of Canada.(2)
Same as above Yes
1990  Government contributions from general revenues completely
eliminated in 1990. Increase on private sector costs of approximately
$1 billion.
None Yes. Used to set 
rates in 1990, 
1992, 1995, & 1996.
1996 - 2001 Renamed Employment Insurance Commission. EI Commission 
aimed for relatively stable rate over the business cycle while ensuring
that there was enough money over the business cycle to pay for 
charges in EI Account. The actuary calculated rates according to
business cycle break-even amounts and suggested rates to commission.
None Yes
The EI Commission initially kept rates high during 1996 and 1997
to build up a reserve. (3) 
2002 - 2005 No set rules. EI Commission no longer in charge of setting rates.
Instead, rates are to be set by governor-in-council (cabinet), on advice
of minsters of Finance and HRSDC.(4) Account remains consolidated.
The Chief Actuary advised on break even rates for upcoming year,
using economic projections of Department of Finance.
None Not needed
2005-2008 EI Commission put back in charge of setting the premium rate. Premium
rate is set in a forward-looking manner such that projected premium
revenues equal projected benefit payments for the next year, taking into
account the Chief Actuary’s report and public input, if any. Premium rate
cannot change by more than 0.15 percent from previous year's rate.(5)
None Yes
2009 -  Budget 2008 created the EI Financing Board, an independent crown
corporation, to oversee the finances of the EI account starting in
January 2009. Rate-setting rules remained largely unchanged but EI
premium revenues are now dedicated for the exclusive use of the EI
program. Actuary’s role is same since 2005.
None Yes
Sources: CIA (2007); Report of Chief Actuary 1998; Budget 2008.
Notes: 1) Initially, all costs when the unemployment rate rose above 4 percent were covered, but this guarantee began to fade around 1976.
2) The reason for making the UI Account part of the Public Accounts is based on the recommendations of the Auditor General, who recommended in   
1983 that the account be consolidated to present a comprehensive view of the government's activities.
3) Notably, the EI Commission did not act upon the recommendations of the Chief Actuary from 1998 to 2001, and instead chose to keep premium 
rates high in accordance with the government’s overall fiscal objectives. 
4) In 2004, the rate was set in legislation. In 2002, 2003, and 2005, premiums were set by the governor-in-council. The Supreme Court of Canada
subsequently ruled on 11 December 2008 that the federal government transformed EI premiums (collected for specific purposes) into payroll taxes
(collected for general purposes) in 2002, 2003, and 2005, and declared this practice illegal unless it can be clearly demonstrated that Parliament
intended to delegate its taxing power authority to the governor-in-council
5)The rate mentioned is that levied on employees. Employers pay 1.4 times the employee rate; hence, the total rate can only move by a maximum of
0.36 percentage points each year.INDEPENDENT REASONED RELEVANT
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This e-brief is a publication of the C.D. Howe Institute.
Colin Busby is a Policy Analyst, and Alexandre Laurin is a Senior Policy Analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute.
For more information call Colin Busby or Alexandre Laurin at 1-416-865-1904.
This e-brief is available at www.cdhowe.org.
Permission is granted to reprint this text if the content is not altered and proper attribution is provided.
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